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502 JACKS V. MONTEREY COUNTY TR. & SAV. BK.

withheld payments after 'the distraint warrants were lifted.'
We are of the opinion that this claim cannot be sustained.
"The trust instrument provided that in the event of the
plaintiff's 'doing any of these inhibited things, or in the
event that an attempt is made to subject said income or
property, or any part thereof, to the payment of any of his
debts or obligations, the trustee in its sole discretion may
withhold any further payment or payments to said Romie
C. Jack.' This language appears to be clear and unambiguous. It was obviously the'trustor's intention to protect the
gift from either attempts by plaintiff to anticipate the pay-(
ments or attempts by plaintiff's creditors to subject suc~
payments to the satisfaction of their claims. To that end,
the trustor gave to the trustee the sole discretion 'to withhold any further payment or payments' in the event any
such attempt might be made. It was stipulated that such
an attempt was made.
"While the word 'withhold' may sometimes be used to
connote a mere temporary holding back as contended by
.plaintiff, it is probably more frequently used to connote a
permanent retention or refraining 'from granting, giving,
allowing, or the like.' (See Webster's New Inter. Dict., 2d
ed.) A consideration of all of the terms creating the trust
here compels the conclusion that the trustor intended to use
the word' withhold' in the latter sense. We are dealing here
with a typical spendthrift trust and the obvious purpose of
the trustor in creating such a trust would be defeated by a
construction which would permit the accumulation of the
prescribed payments and the distribution of a large lump
sum to the beneficiary at anyone time.
"In view of the conclusions which we have reached, it
becomes unnecessary to discuss the question of the right of
plaintiff to interest as that right, if any would have existed,
was dependent upon his right to judgment for some of the
payments claimed by him."
The judgment is reversed.
Edmonds, J., did not participate herein.
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JOSEPH SKERNSWELL, Petitioner, V. GEORGE W.
SCHONFELD, as Judge, etc., et aI., Respondents.
[1] Appeal-Record-Bill of Exceptions-Mandamus.-Mandamus

..

'

is an appropriate remedy where a trial court improperly refuses to settle a bill of exceptions.
[2]' Id.-Record-Bill of Exceptions-Time for Presentation.The time within which to present a proposed bill of exceptions
does not start to run where the copies of the orders appealed
from served on the respondent do not indicate that the orders
had been filed with the clerk, and where no writ'ten notice of
the filing or entry of the orders is given. (See Code Civ.
Proc., §§ 650, 651, 953d.)
[3] Id.-Record-Bill of Exceptions-Duty of Judge.-A trial
judge is not justified in refusing to settle a. proposed bill of
exceptions on the ground that the orders specified. in. the notice of appeal are nonappealable .
[4] Id,-Record-Bill of Exceptions-Reference to Parts of Record.-It is proper in a proposed bill of exceptions to make
reference to certain documents that are to be copied at length
in the final engrossed bill.

PROCEEDING in mandamus to compel the Superior
Court of the City and County of San Francisco and George
W. Schonfeld, Judge thereof, to settle and certify a bill of
exceptions. Writ issued.
Marcel E. Cerf, Robinson & Leland and Henry Robinson
for Petitioner.
'
Joseph A. Brown and A. E. Cross for Respondents.
TRAYNOR, J.-This case raises a problem' of procedure
upon which the parties have presented a stipulation of facts.
In March, 1940, Julius Neustadt brought an action in' the
superior court against Joseph Skernswell, and on May 26,
1941, that court gave judgment in favor of Neustadt. On'
[1] See 2 Cal. Jur. 567.
..
..
'.'
McK. Dig. References: (1] Appeal and Error, § 625; [2] Appeal
and. Error, § 604; [3] Appeal and Error, § 594; [4] Appeal and
Error, §583.
.
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May 29th findings of fact, conclusions of law, and the judgment were filed with the county clerk. On July 10th a motion
for a new trial was denied, and on July 18th defendant filed
notice of appeal. The appeal is now pending in this court.
On July 28th the trial judge, at plaintiff's request, signed
an order setting time of hearing the accounting by the referee, an order directing the referee to take possession of real
property and to collect all rents and income, and an order
directing the referee in partition to sell real property. Copies
of the orders were served on defendant's attorney the same
day but the orders were not filed with the clerk of the cour~
until the following day. On August 1st the trial judge, ~t
plaintiff's request, signed a written order requiring a bond
on appeal. This order was filed with the clerk of the court
on the same day after a copy had been served on defendant's
attorney. None of the copies served on defendant's attorney
contained any statement indiC8.ting that the orders had been
filed with the clerk The parties agree that no written notice
of the filing or entry of any of these orders was given defendant before the filing of the bill of exceptions. On September 10th defendant filed notice of appeal from these orders,
and on September 19th served and on September 20th filed
a proposed bill of exceptions to be used on the appeal. Plaintiff moved to strike the bill of exceptions from the record,
and after a ,hearing th~. trial court made an order granting
the motion. pefendant has petitioned this court for a writ
of mandate ordering the trial court to settle and certify the
bill of exceptions.
.
[1] If a trial court improperly refuses to settle a bill of exceptions, mandamus is an appropriate remedy. (See cases
cited in 2 Cal. Jur. 567.) [2] A bill of exceptions must be pre"
sented within twenty days after written notice of entry of
the judgplent or order, from which the appeal is taken. (Code
Civ. Proc., secs. 650, 651, 953d.) Notice of a judgment or
order does not constitute notice of entry of the judgment or
order. (Leach v. Pierce, 93 Cal. 614,621 [29 Pac. 235] ;
Tobin Grocery Co. v. Spry, 201 Cal. 152 [255 Pac. 791J.)
Since petitioner received no notice of the entry of the orders
before the filing of the proposed bill of exceptions, the latter
was presented in time.
[3] Respondents contend that the trial court was justified
in refusing' to settle the proposed bill of exceptions, on the
around that the orders with which it is concerned are not
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appealable. Sections 649, 650, and 651 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, however, contain no requirement that an order
must be appealable before a bill of exceptions can be settled with respect to it. It is not the function of, the '"trial
court to pass upon the appealability of an order in settling
a bill of exceptions. (G1£tierrez v. He7fbard, 106 Cal. 167,
170 [39 Pac. 529, 935] ; Foley v. Foley, 120 Cal. 33, .38 [52
Pac. 122, 65 Am. St. Rep. 147].) It is the trial court's duty
to prepare a record that accurately indicates what happened
in that court. If the partieplar order is not appealable; the
bill of exceptions may be used upon appeal from some later
judgment or order when the correctness' of the (lrder in question will be reviewed. (Foley' v; Foley, supra.) If an appeal
is taken from the particular order, the question of appealability should be presented to the appellate c6urtby am.6tion
to dismiss after the record has been completed ,l1.nd placed
before that court. (Gutierrez v. Hebbard, supra,):,
.
[4] Respondents contend finally that the proposed bill of exceptions is a skeleton bill, so incomplete .as to justify the
trial court in refusing to settle it. Respondents, however,
make no showing of fraud or lack of good:fa~thonthe part
.~ of petitioner in presenting the bilI. (See Dainty Pretzel COl
'- v. Superior Court, 7 Cal. App. (2d) 437 [45 P: (2d)S17] ;
Nichols v. Smith, 25 Cal. App~ (2d) 94 [76P. (2d) .525] ;
Ambrose v.American Toll Bridge Co., 12 Cal. (2d) 276,
279 [83 P. (2d) 499] ;Walkerley v. Greene, 104 Cal. 208, 212
[37 Pac. 890].) It appears that the draft of the bill is incomplete only to the extent that it merely makes reference
to certain documents that are to be copied at length into
the final engrossed bill. This is an established procedure.
(St. Clair v. Bullock, 12 Cal. (2d) 450,454 [85' P. (2d) 867J ;
Lakeshore Cattle Co. v. Modoc Land & L. Oo.~127 Cal.37~
39 [59 Pac. 206] ; Houghton v. Superior Court,128 Cal. 352,
354 [60 Pac. 972]; Reclamation District v. Hamilton, 112
Cal. 603 [44 Pac. 1074].)
Let a peremptory writ of mandate issue as prayed.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Curtis, J., Edmonds, J., and Car-ter. J't concurred.

